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Abstract: Accurately estimating the effectiveness of stay-at-home orders (SHOs) on reducing 
social contact and disease spread is crucial for mitigating pandemics. Leveraging individual-level 
location data for 10 million smartphones, we observe that by April 30th—when nine in ten 
Americans were under a SHO—daily movement had fallen 70% from pre-COVID levels. One-
quarter of this decline is causally attributable to SHOs, with wide demographic differences in 
compliance, most notably by political affiliation. Likely Trump voters reduce movement by 9% 
following a local SHO, compared to a 21% reduction among their Clinton-voting neighbors, who 
face similar exposure risks and identical government orders. Linking social distancing behavior 
with an epidemic model, we estimate that reductions in movement have causally reduced SARS-
CoV-2 transmission rates by 49%.  
 
One Sentence Summary: Stay-at-home orders modestly reduce movement—by 16% with 









To mitigate the severity of the ongoing COVID pandemic, governments have launched a 
range of social distancing policies including, by early April, mandatory stay-at-home orders 
(SHOs) in forty-five U.S. states and the District of Columbia. Additional gathering restrictions and 
closures of restaurants, schools, and non-essential businesses are gradually being lifted, with at 
least 18 states poised to ease some restrictions and partially reopen the local economy (1), despite 
official forecasts that daily COVID deaths could reach 3,000 by June 1st (2). Expert 
recommendations emphasize the need for first increasing test availability while strengthening 
essential worker training, before incrementally relaxing social distancing policies (3). As 
restrictions are lifted, identifying which policies most effectively reduce virus transmission can 
help lower the risk of a second wave of infections, and mitigate its spread should one arise (4).  
Utilizing device-level geolocation data for 10 million U.S. smartphones to measure individual 
movement, combined with precinct-level election outcomes and block-group level demographics, 
we estimate the causal effect of SHOs on daily movement—and what drives non-compliance.  We 
combine these estimates with an epidemiological model, to estimate the net impact of SHOs and 
other social distancing mandates on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 
Early signs indicate that social distancing can substantially “flatten the curve”, evidenced 
by case reductions following severe travel restrictions in China (5, 6). Lockdowns in several 
European countries are estimated to halve the effective reproduction number 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒, while banning 
public events, closing schools, and encouraging social distancing reduce transmission by 5-20% 
(7). Measures of SHO effectiveness in the United States vary substantially, ranging from an 8% 
reduction in mobility (8) to a 19% decrease in visits outside the home (9), with other studies 
estimating 35-45% fewer cases two weeks after a SHO is implemented (10, 11). In harder hit 





SHOs are thought to cut transmission rates by 50% or more. Given an initial basic reproduction 
number 𝑅𝑅0 of 2.5 to 3.0—and in the absence of widespread vaccination or herd immunity—
transmission reductions of 60-67% are needed to fully curtail the pandemic (15). 
Heterogeneity in adherence to social distancing mandates may stem from variations in local 
infection rates and healthcare capacity, differences in actual or perceived transmission risk, and 
misinformation or mistrust in government-issued orders, which may be exacerbated by selective 
media exposure (9, 16). Survey evidence indicates that partisan identity strongly correlates with 
attitudes towards COVID risk and acceptance of social distancing guidelines (16, 17). Republican 
governors issue distancing policies 1.7 days later, on average, than their Democrat counterparts, a 
delay that reaches 2.7 days in states with a large Trump electorate, even after controlling for local 
case counts (18). Google searches for COVID-related terms are lower in Trump-majority counties, 
although this difference attenuates following reports of self-quarantining by prominent 
Republicans (19). By late April, 38% of Republicans and 5% of Democrats report that “strict 
shelter-in-place measures are placing unnecessary burdens on people and the economy and are 
causing more harm than good” (20). 
Partisan perceptions toward COVID appear to translate into actual behavior differences. 
Several studies document partisan gaps in social distancing using county-level geolocation data, 
including frequency of visits to points of interest (21), average daily distance traveled (19), or 
proportion of residents remaining entirely at home (22). Compliance with state-issued distancing 
orders further drops among residents in the opposite political party as their governor (22), an 
observation supported by survey data (23).  
Accurately estimating the degree to which partisan identity or demographics modify social 





aggregated to the U.S. state (10, 13), county (8, 21), or populated regions in China (5, 6). 
Examining correlations between aggregate distancing behavior and political make-up can 
misestimate partisan responses to stay-at-home orders because Democrat-leaning counties account 
for the overwhelming majority of COVID cases, at all phases of the epidemic (Fig. S5). Analyzing 
movement behavior at the individual-level mitigates this potential confound, by restricting 
comparisons to Trump and Clinton voters who reside in nearby precincts within the same county—
and thus face similar exposure risks, local mandates, and political leaders (Fig. S2). 
We utilize smartphone device-level data to compute the total distance traveled outside the 
home each day, totaling more than 400 million person-day observations. By April 30th, average 
movement had declined 70% from pre-pandemic levels, with SHOs causally accounting for one-
fourth of the decline, a 16% decrease (1–e–0.170 = 0.16, p<0.0001), as many residents severely 
curtailed movement outside the home before obtaining a formal SHO (Fig. 1). Nearly 75% of 
statewide SHOs occurred within two weeks of mandatory school, restaurant, and non-essential 
business closures (1, 24). The combined effect of these closures along with gathering restrictions 
and SHOs was a 31% reduction in travel (p<0.0001, Table S1, column 1), implying that less than 
half the reduction in movement is directly attributable to SHOs, closures and gathering restrictions. 
Consistent with other studies (10, 13), we find that residents of Democrat-leaning states respond 
more strongly to distancing orders (Fig. 2). New York and New Jersey, for instance, witness net 
reductions in movement of nearly 80%, perhaps unsurprisingly as these states account for 40% of 
all U.S. cases.  
Our dataset includes detailed election results for approximately 172,000 voting precincts, 
the finest spatial aggregation publicly reported (25). Our difference-in-differences analysis 





21% (p<0.0001) whereas Trump voters reduce movement by 9% (p<0.0001) (Table S1, column 
2). Comparing likely political affiliation to other key demographics in a multivariate regression 
reveals greater post-SHO movement declines among wealthier, older, urban, more educated, and 
non-white Americans (Table 1). Even after controlling for these covariates, the partisan wedge in 
movement reductions persists and remains statistically significant, with the difference between 
likely Trump and Clinton voters comparable to an increase in annual income of $50,000 or more. 
Mapping the changes in travel behavior before and after a SHO highlights the visual correlation 
between regions most afflicted with COVID and movement reductions (Figs. 3, S3-S4). 
To test the robustness of our empirical specification to unobserved regional differences in 
factors like COVID prevalence or health resources, we compare SHO compliance among 
individuals living within the same Geohash-3 (a 150km×150km square grid), but on opposite sides 
of a county boundary. Although post-SHO movement reductions drop to 14% (Clinton voters) and 
3% (Trump voters), the difference-in-differences remains similar in magnitude (Table S1, column 
3). Comparing residents in the same county but different precincts indicates a 15 percentage-point 
wedge in movement reductions between likely Trump and Clinton voters (Table S1, column 4).  
Our second set of regressions examines to what extent post-SHO reductions in movement 
modify local (within county) SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates, using a standard Susceptible-
Exposed-Infectious-Removed (SEIR) epidemic model. A naïve regression that omits observed 
daily movement—the causal pathway between SHOs and infection transmission—would attribute 
a 52% reduction in transmission rates to SHOs (Table S2, column 1). Interpreting this correlation 
is complicated, as it conflates stay-at-home orders causally reducing cases, and an uptick in cases 
prompting states to enact orders. We aim to correct for this issue by directly estimating the channel 





We estimate that, averaged across the course of the epidemic, each infected person 
transmits the virus to 1.2 other residents in their county, controlling for county differences and 
time trends in case counts (column 2). Here, we apply a 10-day infectiousness period following a 
5-day asymptomatic period (4, 15). By regressing new COVID diagnoses on observed daily 
(lagged) movement, we estimate that for every 10% decrease in meters traveled by residents, the 
local transmission rate decreases by 4.3% (column 3). Combining this estimate with our earlier 
results produces a causal estimate of the reduction in local transmission due to all orders of 15%, 
with one-half of the reduction (7%) directly attributable to SHOs.  
The discrepancy in transmission reductions between the naïve regression and our causal 
estimate is evident from the downward trend in individual movement, well before SHOs went into 
effect (Fig. 1). People reduced movement as the pandemic worsened, driven (presumably) by the 
perceived severity of the crisis, measurably filtered through a partisan lens. Applying these 
estimates to the evolving pandemic, we estimate an average within-county effective reproduction 
number of 1.14 among likely Clinton voters, and 1.32 among likely Trump voters, suggesting that 
a Trump voter who contracts coronavirus infects 16% more people than a comparable Clinton 
voter. 
While other studies also examine partisan patterns in social distancing behavior, our study 
highlights the importance of measuring movement patterns and political variation at more granular 
levels, particularly when an emerging epidemic disproportionately afflicts urban, coastal cities. Of 
the ten counties hardest hit by COVID, all but Suffolk, New York were won by Hillary Clinton, 
with an average two-party vote share of 72% (Fig. S5). By directly measuring the channel through 
which social distancing orders affect behavior, we obtain causal estimates of the impact of such 
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Fig. 1. Average daily travel distance before and after stay-at-home orders.  
Average distance in (A) Trump- and Clinton-majority precincts based on 2016 election results and 







Fig. 2. State-level estimates of social distancing effectiveness.  
Effectiveness estimates are derived from linear difference-in-difference regressions of stay-at-
home and all orders (stay-at-home, gathering restrictions, and school, business and non-essential 
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Fig. 3. Changes in movement following stay-at-home orders for COVID and 2016 Presidential 






 Dependent variable: Daily Movement (arsinh meters) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stay-at-Home × Trump Share 0.257*** 0.181*** 0.221*** 0.122*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00204) (0.00217) (0.00288) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Pop. Density  -0.00367*** -0.00427*** -0.00362*** 
  (0.0000461) (0.0000484) (0.0000480) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Age   -0.00105*** -0.00207*** 
   (0.0000495) (0.0000522) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Income   -0.0270*** -0.0238*** 
   (0.000178) (0.000181) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Bach. Deg.   -0.372*** -0.368*** 
   (0.00522) (0.00533) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Grad. Deg.   -0.177*** -0.215*** 
   (0.00616) (0.00635) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Black    -0.0369*** 
    (0.00297) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Hispanic    -0.132*** 
    (0.00261) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Asian    -0.498*** 
    (0.00567) 
     
Controls for Govt. Restrictions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 423,803,900 423,631,796 416,267,558 416,267,558 
R2 0.446 0.446 0.447 0.447 








Table 1. Partisan and demographic predictors of stay-at-home compliance.  
Each linear difference-in-differences regression estimates the effect of government stay-at-home 
orders on daily movements of smartphone users, and the effect of demographics on compliance. 
Trump Share is precinct-level two-party vote share won by Donald Trump in 2016. All other 
demographics are from the 2017 American Community Survey, reported at the Census block-
group level. Population density is thousands of residents per square mile; Age is median household 
age in years; Income is median annual household earnings in units of $10,000. Education (no/some 
college, bachelor’s degree, or graduate degree), and Race (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian) are 
proportions within a block-group. All regressions include controls for other government orders: 
large-gathering restrictions, and non-essential business, restaurant, and school closures. 
Smartphone-user fixed effects control for time-invariant demographics, and date fixed effects 
control for day-to-day changes in aggregate movement. Standard errors are clustered by 
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We utilize four primary datasets in our analyses: (1) Individual-level smartphone GPS location 
data, (2) 2016 U.S. precinct-level election results, (3) U.S. county-level COVID diagnoses, and 
(4) State- and county-level official policies in response to the COVID pandemic.  
 
Our device-level smartphone GPS data is from Veraset, a company that aggregates anonymized 
GPS data from smartphone applications. After filtering for consistently observed smartphones, the 
dataset is comprised of over 10 million smartphones spanning the continental U.S. The data 
comprise these smartphones’ “pings” which record that phone’s geo-location and timestamp. 
Pings are logged at irregular time intervals whenever a participating smartphone application 
requests location information. The modal time interval between two pings for a device is roughly 
10 minutes. Our sample covers the last two weeks of February through April 30th. To ensure our 
sample includes only users who we observe consistently and reliably over the study period, we 
exclude smartphone-day observations with less than 10 location pings, and users with fewer than 
20 observations in the critical period of March and April. 
 
Precinct-level voting data, collected through internet scraping and electoral authorities, records the 
vote share won by Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election for 172,098 precincts 
across 99.9% of counties nationally (25). We infer each smartphone device’s “home” voting 
precinct using all pings between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. over our sample period; this is then 
linked to that precinct’s 2016 two-party vote share to proxy for a user’s political affiliation. Our 
measure of movement (and non-compliance with stay-at-home orders) is a user’s daily travel 
distance, which is the total distance between all consecutive pings during a day.  
 
COVID data is from the New York Times, and includes daily cumulative confirmed diagnoses at 
the county-level (27). County-level intervention policy data are collected from (1, 24) and include 
the dates when each specific policy took effect. We categorize all policies into one of five groups: 
school closures, non-essential business closures, public gathering restrictions, restaurant 
restrictions, and stay-at-home orders. 
 
Our approach for combining individual smartphone pings with election data is similar to (28), who 
estimate the effect of post-election partisanship on Thanksgiving durations. Here, we merge these 
data with epidemic case data and government-issued policies, allowing us to identify off variation 
in the timing and location of policy enactment. We arrive at causal estimates of the impact of 
policies, such as stay-at-home orders, on case counts by directly observing the exact causal 





To estimate how social distancing affects future COVID cases, we employ a Susceptible-Exposed-
Infected-Recovered (SEIR) compartmental model for each U.S. county. In essence, this model 





asymptomatic to symptomatic infection, and recovery or death. Uninfected individuals who are 
susceptible to the disease (i.e., those with no immunity triggered by prior infection) can contract 
the virus, after which they remain exposed with latent (asymptomatic) infection for a period of 
time with average duration 1/𝜆𝜆, which we assume to be 5 days. Exposed individuals then progress 
to an infectious state, where they remain until either death (with rate 𝜇𝜇) or recovery (with rate 𝛿𝛿) 
occurs. 
 
Within each county, susceptible individuals can contract coronavirus from infected individuals 
with a transmission rate of 𝛽𝛽. Importantly, asymptomatic individuals with latent infection can also 
transmit the virus to susceptibles at a lower contact rate of 𝜖𝜖𝛽𝛽, where 0 < 𝜖𝜖 < 1. The model is 



























The basic reproduction number 𝑅𝑅0– the average number of secondary cases caused by an infected 
individual in a predominantly susceptible population–is computed using a linearization of the 
SEIR model at the disease-free equilibrium. 
  
𝑅𝑅0 = 𝜖𝜖𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 + 𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 + 𝜇𝜇) 
 
Here, the first term corresponds to new cases arising from the exposed (latent) period, which is the 
product of the net transmission rate 𝜖𝜖𝛽𝛽 and the duration 1/𝜆𝜆. The second term corresponds to new 
cases arising from the infected period, which is again the product of the transmission rate 𝛽𝛽 and 
the average duration of infectivity  1/(𝛿𝛿 + 𝜇𝜇). Note, the transmission rate 𝛽𝛽 can be thought of as 
the number of social contacts per unit time n multiplied by the probability of viral transmission 
per contact 𝑝𝑝. 
 
During a widespread pandemic, the presence of social distancing and other interventions aim to 
reduce the effective reproduction number 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 below the critical threshold of 1. Suppressing onward 
disease transmission is most directly achieved through reducing 𝛽𝛽 via either reducing 𝑛𝑛 (e.g., 
through stay-at-home orders, school closures, non-essential business closures, and gathering 
restrictions) or reducing 𝑝𝑝 (e.g., through use of facemasks, personal protective equipment for 






As a direct result of social distancing mandates, or people altering their behavior to reduce 
exposure risk, the transmission rate 𝛽𝛽 is changing over time. Although we cannot directly observe 
this parameter, we use a locally linear regression to estimate how changes in daily movement—
and thus 𝛽𝛽—affect the number of new COVID diagnoses. This is akin to linearizing the nonlinear 
SEIR model equations to compute the reproduction number 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 near the disease-free equilibrium. 
By multiplying our estimated 𝛽𝛽 by the average duration of infectivity, we can obtain an 
approximation for the intra-county reproduction number, which likely underestimates the 
aggregate cross-county value. 
 
 
Estimation Strategy and Specifications 
 
Our regressions are designed to estimate the causal impact of government distancing policies on 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the presence of any of the unobserved confounding factors depicted 
in the directed acyclic graph (DAG) in Fig. S1. These include any time-invariant individual 
demographics 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 that both directly affect measured movement and sort individuals into counties 
with different policies (e.g., education, income), county-level characteristics 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐′  correlated with 
aggregate movement and COVID levels (e.g., population density), any regional time trends 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 
that effect both local movement and county distancing policies (e.g. spring break in costal FL), 
and any national time trends 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟′  that correlate with both movement and COVID levels (e.g. changes 
in national testing guidelines). 
 
Most important, any county-time 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 that correlate the timing of distancing policies 
with new cases would bias the observed relationship (in the naïve regression) between policies and 
disease suppression. For instance, an increase in neighboring counties’ COVID cases could lead 
to both more local cases and prompt aggressive county-level distancing policies. By explicitly 
restricting our estimates to those attributable to changes in individual movement—the causal path 
between distancing policies and disease transmission—our approach mitigates this potential for 
bias. What could still bias our estimates would be a strong county-time confound that effects both 
movement and new cases in that county at that time, but is not reflected in that county’s distancing 
policies. Even in the presence of such a confound though, our estimate would likely still be closer 
to the true effect that what a naïve regression would measure. 
 
 
Fig. S1. Directed acyclic graph (DAG) modeling the causal effect of social distancing policies on 




𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟  𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑.𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐′  





Regression 1 below estimates the effect of distancing policies on movement without conditioning 
on COVID cases. Regression 2 then estimates the effect of movement on local transmission (i.e., 
within an infected individual’s county) controlling for any social distancing policies. Combining 
those estimates to arrive at the effectiveness of distancing policies at reducing SARS-CoV-2 
transmission is equivalent to a “front-door” causal estimator as first developed by Pearl (26), and 
first used by Glynn and Kashin (29). 
 
Regression 1 
Our first regression estimates the degree to which policies (e.g., stay-at-home orders) reduce 
movement of individual residents. 
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝒊𝒊 + 𝛼𝛼F𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 is the daily movement outside the home (measured in arsinh meters) traveled by 
individual 𝐷𝐷 on day 𝑑𝑑.  𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 is a vector of dummy variables for government distancing policies 
(stay-at-home orders, gathering restrictions, school closures, restaurant closures, and non-essential 
business closures) that individual 𝐷𝐷 experiences on day 𝑑𝑑. Note that most policies are enacted at the 
state-level, but a small fraction were originally implemented by individual counties (24). F𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 are 
diff-in-diff-in-diff fixed effects for individual 𝐷𝐷 and spatial unit r × day. We proxy individual 𝐷𝐷’s 
political affiliation using 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖, the two-party vote share won by Donald Trump in 
individual 𝐷𝐷’s home precinct in the 2016 Presidential election. This regression estimates the causal 
impact of distancing policies on reducing resident movement, since not conditioning on COVID 
cases leaves 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 and 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 conditionally independent even in the presence of 




Our second regression estimates the local (within county) transmission rate of SARS-CoV-2, as 
derived in the SEIR model above. 
 
𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼F𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 
𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 are new COVID diagnoses in county 𝑃𝑃 on day 𝑑𝑑.  𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the sum of 
previously diagnosed cases in county 𝑃𝑃 from time 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑑𝑑 − (1/𝜆𝜆) and extending back the duration 
of infectivity 1/(𝛿𝛿 + 𝜇𝜇). 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the average daily movement of smartphone users in 
county 𝑃𝑃 on day 𝜏𝜏.  𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a vector of dummy variables for government distancing policies in 







Fig. S2. Map of New York City metro area, with county boundaries outlined in black and geohash-
3 boundaries in green. Letters indicate illustrative comparison groups from our regression 
specification. Points A and B represent individuals in different counties and states (Westchester, 
NY and Fairfield, CT), but with similar precinct Trump Shares. Points C and D represent 
individuals in the same county (Nassau, NY) but in precincts with differing Trump Shares. 






We merge our own precinct-level vote counts for the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, to construct 
the two-party vote share won by Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (25). Using smartphone device-
level geolocation data, we compute average daily distance traveled (arsinh meters) before and after 
stay-at-home orders are enacted, and aggregate these values to larger geographical units.  
 
We plot the change in daily movement and two-party vote share, by county (in less densely 
populated areas) or PUMA (in more densely populated areas), to provide a visual correlation 
between the two measures. A PUMA, or Public Use Microdata Area, is a Census-designated sub-


















Fig. S3. Changes in movement following stay-at-home orders for COVID and 2016 Presidential 






















































Fig. S4. Changes in movement following stay-at-home orders for COVID and 2016 Presidential 

















Table S1. Effect of government orders on observed movement.  
Each column is a linear difference-in-differences regression estimating the impact of government 
orders on observed daily movements of smartphone users, and the effect of partisanship on 
compliance (column 2-4). Trump Share is the precinct-level two-party vote share won by Donald 
Trump in 2016. All reported effect sizes are marginal net of all other orders. The direct effect of 
orders cannot be measured in column 4 because orders do not vary within counties on the same 
day; those coefficients are labeled NA. Smartphone-user fixed effects control for time-invariant 
demographics, and region × date fixed effects control for local day-to-day changes in aggregate 
movement. The sample includes 3,108 counties (or county equivalents) and 487 geohash-3 regions 
(a 150km × 150km square grid). Standard errors are clustered at the smartphone-user level and 
reported in parentheses with significance levels: * p<0.01, ** p<0.001, ***p<0.0001. 
 
 Dependent variable: Daily Movement (arsinh meters) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stay-at-Home Order -0.170*** -0.238*** -0.156*** NA  (0.000677) (0.00161) (0.00204) 
     
Gathering Restrictions -0.0215*** -0.0567*** -0.00124 NA  (0.000606) (0.00144) (0.00222) 
     
Non-Essent. Business Closures -0.0990*** -0.791*** -0.0205*** NA  (0.000701) (0.00177) (0.00206) 
     
Restaurant Closures -0.0466*** -0.0860*** 0.00806* NA  (0.000772) (0.00182) (0.00296) 
     
School Closures -0.0290*** -0.0441*** 0.0139*** NA  (0.000735) (0.00158) (0.00181) 
     
Stay-at-Home × Trump Share  0.143*** 0.129*** 0.147*** 
  (0.00263) (0.00306) (0.00419) 
     
Gathering × Trump Share  0.0596*** -0.0246*** -0.0818*** 
  (0.00255) (0.00305) (0.00389) 
     
Business × Trump Share  0.00129 -0.0728*** -0.126*** 
  (0.00297) (0.00344) (0.00469) 
     
Restaurant × Trump Share  0.0770*** -0.00267 -0.00177 
  (0.00307) (0.00353) (0.00453) 
     
School × Trump Share  0.0221*** -0.0784*** -0.219*** 
  (0.00272) (0.00309) (0.00397) 
     
Observations 423,803,900 423,803,900 423,803,900 423,803,900 
R2 0.446 0.446 0.448 0.450 





Geo3 × Date 
Person, 







 Dependent variable: Daily New COVID Cases (county level) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Infectious Residents 0.893 0.123*** 0.0263 0.0287 
 (0.637) (0.00251) (0.0560) (0.0559) 
     
Lagged Daily Movement     -3.212*** 
    (0.718) 
     
Lagged Infectious Residents   0.0120 0.0117 
  × Daily Movement    (0.00716) (0.00715) 
     
Lagged Infectious Residents  -0.464***    
  × Stay-at-Home Order (0.0470)    
     
Lagged Infectious Residents -0.0677***    
  × Gathering Restrictions (0.0147)    
     
Lagged Infectious Residents -0.244    




     
Lagged Infectious Residents 0.174**    
  × Restaurant Closures (0.0493)    
     
Lagged Infectious Residents -0.163    
  × School Closures (0.495)    
     
Controls for Govt. Restrictions No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155,400 155,423 155,400 155,400 
R2 0.866 0.826 0.826 0.826 
Fixed Effects County, Date County, Date County, Date County, Date 
Table S2. SEIR epidemic model estimation.  
Each column fits a SEIR model to daily county-level COVID cases. Independent variables are 
lagged for 5 days, representing the average asymptomatic period. Daily movement is measured in 
arsinh meters. Column 1 estimates a naïve regression examining how various government orders 
correlate with reduced transmission rates. Column 2 estimates the average local (within county) 
daily transmission rate per infectious individual. Columns 3-4 estimate the degree to which the 
local transmission rate depends on observed movement levels of county residents. Columns 2-4 
control for the direct effect of government restrictions. In columns 3-4, a 10% reduction in daily 
movement is estimated to reduce transmission by 4-5% [ln(0.9) × 0.0120 / 0.0263) = -0.043]. F-tests 
for the joint significance of Lagged Infectious & Lagged Infectious × Movement are significant at 
the p<0.0001 level. The sample includes 3,108 counties (or county equivalents). Standard errors 
are clustered at the county-level and reported in parentheses with significance levels: * p<0.01, ** 
p<0.001, ***p<0.0001. 
 
 
